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CALIFORNIA’S FAIR PAY TO PLAY ACT AND ITS FIGHT AGAINST 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Paul McDonnell* 
California Senate Bill 206, more aptly referred to as the Fair Pay to Play 
Act, has sent shockwaves through the intercollegiate athletic community. 
Under current National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules and 
regulations, student athletes are significantly restricted with respect to where 
financial aid comes from and what they can do with the financial aid that they 
do receive.1 According to the NCAA Division I Manual, “Any student who 
receives financial aid other than that administered by the student-athlete’s 
institution shall not be eligible for intercollegiate athletics competition.”2 
Section 2.13 defines the types of financial aid a student athlete may receive 
to be eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics: 
A student-athlete may receive athletically related financial aid administered by the 
institution without violating the principle of amateurism, provided the amount 
does not exceed the cost of education authorized by the Association; however, 
such aid as defined by the Association shall not exceed the cost of attendance as 
published by each institution. Any other financial assistance, except that received 
from one upon whom the student-athlete is naturally or legally dependent, shall 
be prohibited unless specifically authorized by the Association.3 
                                                                                                                           
 
* JD Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2021; B.S., Physics, Gettysburg College 
2017. 
1 See generally ACAD. AND MEMBERSHIP AFFS. STAFF, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
2019–20 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 15 (2020) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. 
2 Id. art. 15.01.3. 
3 Id. art. 2.13. 
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The Fair Pay to Play Act is the first of its kind and will allow student athletes 
to obtain financial aid from sources other than the institution they attend and 
those upon whom they are naturally or legally dependent.4 The Fair Pay to 
Play Act will allow them to earn compensation from their name, image, and 
likeness, hire agents, and be paid compensation for endorsements.5 
There are many reasons why people believe that student athletes should 
be paid compensation beyond the costs of attending the colleges or 
universities where they play. One reason is that students need the money.6 
Scholarships do not provide recipients with spending money7 for student 
athletes to use for leisure activities, like going to the movies. Another reason 
why student athletes should be compensated is based on the economic value 
they bring to their colleges and universities. One article looked at the 2014–
2015 Duke University Men’s Basketball team to demonstrate the value the 
student athletes bring to the University.8 That year, in which the team won 
the NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Championship, the team generated 
$33.7 million in revenue.9 Duke cannot pay its players more than the cost of 
attendance, as dictated by NCAA regulations, limiting the “pay” of each 
player to $67,654.10 Combining the pay of all players shows that Duke only 
paid its players 2.4% of the revenue that they were responsible for 
generating.11 In contrast, professional basketball players in the NBA are 
guaranteed a 50% share of their teams’ respective revenues, per a collective 
bargaining agreement.12 If Duke were forced to follow an NBA-type 
compensation structure, then each player would have received $1.4 million 
(given an even per player split).13 This example shows that student athletes 
are generating massive revenues for colleges and universities without 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 Jack Kelly, Newly Passed California Fair Pay To Play Act Will Allow Student Athletes To Receive 




6 See Stephen M. Schott, Give Them What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete for 
Participation in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 SPORTS LAW. J. 25, 28, 46 (1996). 
7 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 2.13. 
8 See David J. Berri, Paying NCAA Athletes, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 479 (2016). 
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receiving a reasonable share of the money. Support for paying student 
athletes is widespread, as public figures from Bernie Sanders to Lebron 
James believe compensating student athletes is long overdue.14 
There is also strong opposition to paying student athletes compensation 
beyond the cost of attendance. Academic work over the years has highlighted 
many of the difficulties of implementing such a system.15 One proposed 
method of payment is a monthly stipend paid to an equal number of male and 
female Division I student-athletes in revenue producing sports.16 However, 
issues arise with respect to: (1) antitrust law (a stipend may be viewed as 
price fixing that violates the Sherman Act),17 (2) workers’ compensation (a 
stipend would make student athletes “employees” under most state workers’ 
compensation laws),18 (3) labor law (status as wage earning employees 
would give student athletes the right to unionize and bargain collectively 
under the National Labor Relations Act),19 (4) Title IX issues (universities 
may attempt to distinguish scholarships from stipends to avoid the equal 
opportunity requirement of Title IX),20 and (5) taxation issues (a stipend 
would increase taxable income and create problems for student athletes that 
may not be able to afford the additional tax liability).21 Some opponents of 
paying student athletes argue that the free education and college degree that 
student athletes receive is sufficient compensation.22 Others believe that 
paying student athletes makes them select schools not because of their quality 
or reputation, but because of the money they could make, which one author 
argues would erode the association of value or excellence that prestigious 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 E.g., Bernie Sanders (@BernieSanders), TWITTER (Sept. 6, 2019, 11:10 AM), https:// 
twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/1169991265200562176 (“College athletes are workers. Pay them.”); 
Lebron James (@KingJames), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2019, 11:21 AM), https://twitter.com/KingJames/status/ 
1169631712009080832 (“Everyone is California—call your politicians and tell them to support SB 206! 
This law is a GAME CHANGER. College athletes can responsibly get paid for what they do and the 
billions they create.”). 
15 See, e.g., Thomas R. Hurst & J. Grier Pressly III, Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal & Practical 
Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 55 (2000). 
16 Id. at 60. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 66–70. 
19 Id. at 70–71. 
20 Id. at 71–73. 
21 Id. at 73–74. 
22 Id. at 59. 
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universities have cultivated.23 Tim Tebow, former quarterback of the Florida 
University football team and current ESPN College Football Analyst, 
believes that paying student athletes “changes what’s special about college 
football.”24 
The NCAA’s response to the Fair Pay to Play Act has been interesting 
to say the least. After the Act passed through the California House of 
Representatives and Senate, members of the NCAA Board of Governors sent 
a letter to California Governor Gavin Newsom warning him of the 
consequences of enacting the legislation.25 The Board of Governors said the 
Act “would erase the critical distinction between college and professional 
athletics and, because it gives those schools an unfair recruiting advantage, 
would result in them eventually being unable to compete in NCAA 
competitions.”26 After taking such a strong stance against the Act, the NCAA 
made the unexpected announcement that it would allow students to earn 
compensation.27 With the NCAA seemingly on board with the Act, the Fair 
Pay to Play Act must now turn its attention to a more difficult obstacle: The 
United States Constitution. 
Part I of this Article establishes a historical background on the NCAA’s 
policies towards student athletes receiving compensation during their 
collegiate careers. Section II discusses the history of the Commerce Clause, 
its evolution through history, and the breadth of power it bestows on 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Section III discusses the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, its doctrinal foundation, and how it is used to restrict 
states from enacting legislation that effects interstate commerce. Sections IV 
and V discuss the key Ninth Circuit decision NCAA v. Miller28 and whether 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 Ekrow N. Yankah, Why N.C.A.A. Athletes Shouldn’t be Paid, NEW YORKER (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/sports/sporting-scene/why-ncaa-athletes-shouldnt-be-paid. 
24 Jenna West, Tim Tebow on Fair Pay to Play Act: ‘It Changes What’s Special About College 
Football,’ SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/09/13/tim-tebow-
fair-pay-play-act-playing-college-players-video. 
25 NCAA Responds to California Senate Bill 206, NCAA (Sept. 11, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/ 
about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-responds-california-senate-bill-206. 
26 Id. 
27 Colin Dwyer, NCAA Plans to Allow College Athletes to Get Paid for Use of Their Names, Images, 
NPR (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/29/774439078/ncaa-starts-process-to-allow-
compensation-for-college-athletes. 
28 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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the Fair Pay to Play Act in fact violates the Commerce Clause. This Article 
concludes with an outlook into the future of paying student athletes. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NCAA’S OPPOSITION TO PAYING 
STUDENT ATHLETES 
The commercialization of college sports can be traced back to as early 
as the late 19th century.29 One of the earliest revenue generating events was 
the 1893 Thanksgiving Day football game between Princeton University and 
Yale University, which attracted 40,000 spectators and generated $13,000 in 
revenue for each university.30 Today, collegiate athletics is a billion dollar 
industry, the NCAA alone generating just over $1 billion in revenue for the 
year ending on August 31, 2018.31 Despite the change in commercialization 
over time, the NCAA has not changed its stance on amateurism. As early as 
1910, the NCAA (and its predecessors) believed in amateurism as a core 
component of collegiate athletics, mirroring the amateurism of the Olympic 
Games at the time.32 College sports remained a regional affair for most of the 
mid-20th century.33 In the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, college sports began its 
evolution into the juggernaut it is today, with television deals marking this 
beginning.34 The NCAA and its officials stood by its amateurism policies 
through it all.35 Today, the NCAA describes it principles of amateurism in 
Bylaw 2.9.36 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 Berri, supra note 8, at 481. 
30 Id. 
31 DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND SUBSIDIARIES 
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE YEARS ENDED AUGUST 31, 2018 AND 2017 
(2018), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/finance/2017-18NCAAFin_NCAAFinancialStatement 
.pdf. 
32 Matt Hinton, The Origins of Amateurism; Or, Why College Sports Are So Fucked Up, DEADSPIN 





36 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at art. 2.9 (“Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an 
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the 
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an 
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial 
enterprises.”). 
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In the past decade, the NCAA has faced a number of legal challenges to 
its amateurism rules. United States District Court Judge Claudia Wilken held 
in O’Bannon v. NCAA37 that the NCAA amateurism rules did in fact violate 
federal antitrust laws.38 The court awarded players $5,000 per year in 
connection with the rights to their name, image, and likeness.39 On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the federal antitrust violation, but 
reduced the payment to a cost of attendance payment,40 which most schools 
that provide athletic scholarships already provide.41 In 2014, football players 
at Northwestern University brought an appeal for a proposed union before 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).42 The initial ruling favored the 
athletes, supporting the argument that they were employees who had the right 
to unionize.43 However, the NLRB refused to rule on the appeal, effectively 
denying the student athletes the right to unionize.44 The results of these 
challenges demonstrate the unlikelihood that the NCAA will be forced to 
change its amateurism policies, meaning student athletes will continue to 
participate in collegiate athletics without pay. 
II. WHAT CAN CONGRESS REGULATE UNDER ITS COMMERCE CLAUSE 
AUTHORITY? 
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress 
“the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”45 The history of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence is filled with debate over the extent of federal power to 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
38 Id. at 1007 (finding that the NCAA’s challenged rules unreasonably restrain trade in violation of 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act). 
39 Id. at 1008 (prohibiting the NCAA from paying less than $5,000 for every year that the student-
athlete remains academically eligible to compete). 
40 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2015). 
41 Michael McCann, What the Appeals Court Ruling Means for O’Bannon’s Ongoing NCAA 
Lawsuit, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.si.com/college/2015/09/30/ed-obannon-
ncaa-lawsuit-appeals-court-ruling. 
42 Berri, supra note 8, at 479. 
43 Id. at 480. 
44 Id. 
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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regulate interstate activity.46 In the country’s earliest years, the Supreme 
Court construed the Commerce Clause narrowly, defining “interstate 
commerce” as trade, covering the buying and selling of goods in interstate 
markets, the interstate transportation of those goods, and interstate travel.47 
While the earliest Commerce Clause cases narrowly defined congressional 
commerce power, the Court recognized that “the power to regulate 
commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly 
various subjects.”48 
Today, Congress’s powers to regulate under the Commerce Clause are 
much broader than the narrow construction applied in the 19th century. 
Generally, the Court accepts that Congress may regulate the channels of 
interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, any goods 
or persons that travel in interstate commerce, and any activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.49 Congress may only regulate 
existing commercial activity and may not compel individuals to become 
active in commerce.50 The power to regulate activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce gives Congress expansive power.51 This 
expansive power has permitted congressional regulation of local matters, 
including a farmer’s decision to grow wheat for his livestock and a loan 
shark’s extortionate collections from a local butcher shop.52 The Supreme 
Court has held that the NCAA is an organization engaged in interstate 
commerce, and therefore regulation of the NCAA can be considered 
regulation of interstate commerce.53 The NCAA markets intercollegiate 
athletic competition, which was found to sufficiently implicate NCAA 
engagement in interstate commerce, subjecting the NCAA to federal antitrust 
regulations.54 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 David S. Schwartz, An Error and An Evil: The Strange History of Implied Commerce Powers, 
68 AM. U. L. REV. 927, 930 (2019). 
47 Id. 
48 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852). 
49 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012). 
50 Id. at 552. 
51 Id. at 539. 
52 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
53 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984). 
54 Id. 
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III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE  
A. History 
The Commerce Clause is a not a prohibitory clause—it grants power to 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce but does not expressly prohibit 
states from regulating interstate commerce.55 The Commerce Clause does, 
however, possess a prohibitory effect on state legislation through the 
Supremacy Clause56 and years of Supreme Court decisions.57 This 
prohibitory effect on states is known as the Dormant Commerce Clause.58 
The Commerce Clause is not only a power-allocating provision that gives 
Congress authority over the regulation of interstate commerce; it is also a 
substantive “restriction on permissible state regulation” of interstate 
commerce.59 The Commerce Clause has long been recognized as a self-
executing limitation on the power of the state to enact laws imposing 
substantial burdens on such interstate commerce.60 
The earliest Supreme Court cases decided that states may not enact 
legislation that infringes on Congress’s authority to regulate interstate 
commerce, prohibiting states from enacting legislation that has any effect on 
interstate commerce while reserving the power to regulate “completely 
internal commerce of a State” to the State.61 In 1841, the Supreme Court 
reinforced the standard that “[t]he commercial power, as it regards . . . 
commerce among the several states, has been decided . . . to be exclusively 
vested in [C]ongress.”62 Supreme Court rulings from the pre-Civil War 19th 
century prohibited states from taxing interstate commerce, but allowed states 
                                                                                                                           
 
55 James L. Buchwalter, Construction and Application of Dormant Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3—Supreme Court Cases, 41 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, 2 (2020). 
56 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
57 See generally Buchwalter, supra note 55 (reciting Supreme Court cases discussing the Dormant 
Commerce Clause). 
58 Buchwalter, supra note 55, at 5. 
59 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 
(1979)). 
60 S. Cent. Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1979). 
61 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). 
62 Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 505 (1841). 
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to exercise their police power to regulate commerce that was not interstate in 
nature.63 
The development of the national economy, however, created tension 
between the federal government and the states, as interstate and intrastate 
activities became increasingly intertwined, and demanded a new formulation 
of interstate commerce regulation.64 The post-Reconstruction Era Supreme 
Court decided that state legislation that directly affected interstate commerce 
intruded on federal authority and therefore violated the Commerce Clause.65 
Courts permitted state legislation regulating intrastate activities that 
indirectly affected interstate commerce, provided that any indirect effect was 
not unreasonable.66 This direct effect versus indirect effect test of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause endured into the 20th century. 
The New Deal Court of the 1930s and 1940s, in conjunction with its 
broadening of the Commerce Clause power,67 redefined the Dormant 
Commerce Clause framework. The Court expressed concerns with its ability 
to reliably and consistently distinguish between state legislation with a direct 
effect on interstate commerce from that with an indirect effect on interstate 
commerce.68 The Court recognized that “there is a residuum of power in the 
                                                                                                                           
 
63 See, e.g., Case of State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 279 (1872) (“If, then, this is a tax 
upon freight carried between States, and a tax because of its transportation, and if such a tax is in effect a 
regulation of interstate commerce, the conclusion seems to be inevitable that it is in conflict with the 
Constitution of the United States.”); Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887) (“Interstate 
commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic 
commerce, or that which is carried on solely within the state.”). 
64 Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 DENV. L. REV. 255, 275 
(2017). 
65 See, e.g., Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328, 334 (1907) (“That any exercise of 
state authority, in whatever form manifested, which directly regulates interstate commerce, is repugnant 
to the commerce clause of the Constitution is obvious.”). 
66 See, e.g., Barrett v. New York, 232 U.S. 14, 31 (1914) (“the exertion of the power essential to 
assure needed protection to the community may extend incidentally to the operations of a carrier in its 
interstate business, provided it does not subject that business to unreasonable demands.”); Buck v. 
Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925) (“It may be assumed . . . that appropriate state regulations adopted 
primarily to promote safety upon highways and conservation in their use are not obnoxious to the 
Commerce Clause, where the indirect burden imposed on interstate commerce is not unreasonable.”). 
67 See generally Schwartz, supra note 46, at 1004–11 (discussing the expansion of Commerce 
Clause power during the 1930s and 1940s). 
68 See, e.g., Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 227 (1908) 
(“[L]ook[ing] for a practical rather than a logical or philosophical distinction.”); W. Live Stock v. Bureau 
of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 259 (1938) (“Practical rather than logical distinctions [between local effect and 
interstate effect] must be sought.”). 
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state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in 
some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate 
it.”69 The Court addressed these concerns in Wickard v. Filburn.70 The 
Court’s decision in Wickard granted Congress power to regulate purely 
intrastate activities if the activities substantially affect interstate commerce.71 
This essentially prohibits States from enacting legislation that regulates 
purely intrastate activities if they substantially affect interstate commerce.72 
Considering whether a state statute discriminated against interstate 
commerce and whether there was a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
forms the foundation of modern Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
B. Modern Framework: A Two-Tiered Test 
The Supreme Court has outlined a two-tiered test for analyzing state 
legislation under the Dormant Commerce Clause.  
1. Discriminatory State Legislation 
State legislation is held per se invalid when it “directly regulates or 
discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-
state economic interests over out of state economic interests.”73 There are 
two major types of discrimination seen in Dormant Commerce Clause cases: 
facial discrimination and effect-based discrimination.74 
a. Facial Discrimination 
State legislation that is facially discriminatory explicitly discriminates 
against interstate or out-of-state commerce on its face.75 It can also include 
legislation which discriminates explicitly against business, activities, or other 
                                                                                                                           
 
69 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945). 
70 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
71 Id. at 124. 
72 Id. 
73 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 n.14 (1989). 
74 Francis, supra note 64, at 261. 
75 Id. 
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entities that operate interstate or wholly out of state.76 For example, a New 
Jersey statute that explicitly prohibited the import of out-of-state waste was 
found facially discriminatory and condemned under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.77 There is no de minimis exception to the rule against facial 
discrimination, so if the legislation is found to be facially discriminatory, a 
showing that its burden on interstate commerce is negligible cannot save it.78 
b. Effect Based Discrimination 
Effect based discrimination is found when the overall tendency of the 
legislation is to affect interstate or out of state commerce.79 “The critical 
consideration is the overall effect of the statute on local and interstate 
activity.”80 This can occur when interstate or out-of-state effected entities are 
subject to the regulations more often or are subject to a heavier burden than 
equivalent intrastate entities.81 For example, the Supreme Court found effect 
based discrimination where an Alaska statute required that timber taken from 
state lands be processed within Alaska before being exported.82 
c. Legitimate State Interest 
State legislation can survive a finding of discrimination if the state 
demonstrates that the legislation advances a legitimate local interest that 
cannot be adequately served by reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives.83 
While the Court originally analyzed the legitimacy of the state’s interest 
under strict scrutiny, the analysis has evolved into a more permissive 
analysis, closer to rational basis scrutiny.84 
                                                                                                                           
 
76 Id. at 261–62. 
77 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
78 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455–56 (1992). 
79 Francis, supra note 64, at 262–63. 
80 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). 
81 Francis, supra note 64, at 262. 
82 S. Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84–85 (1984). 
83 Francis, supra note 64, at 264. 
84 Id. at 265. 
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2. Burden on Interstate Commerce 
The Court will proceed with its analysis of the state legislation if it 
“regulates even handedly” (i.e. is not discriminatory) or if it “effectuates a 
legitimate local public interest.”85 That being said, the tendency of modern 
courts has been to require that a statute advance a legitimate state interest, 
even when found to be non-discriminatory.86 If a legitimate interest exists 
and the effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, the Court 
considers “whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the 
local benefits.”87 This balancing test is commonly referred to as the Pike 
balancing test.88 The Court considers factors like the nature of the local 
interest and the existence of alternative measures for promoting the local 
interest that do not burden interstate commerce.89 The Court conducts its 
analysis of burdens on interstate commerce with significant deference to the 
state.90 As such, burden balancing only comes into play in clear cases.91 
IV. NCAA V. MILLER 
A seemingly unimportant decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals from 1993 is likely to decide whether the Fair Pay to Play Act is 
constitutional. Before the court in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller92 
was a Nevada statute requiring any national collegiate athletic association93 
to provide a Nevada institution, employee, student-athlete, or booster 
accused of a rules infraction with procedural due process protection during 
enforcement proceedings in which sanctions may be imposed.94 The statute 
required procedures not required by the NCAA, like the right to confront all 
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witnesses.95 In addition, the statute effectively prohibited the NCAA from 
expelling its Nevada member institutions in order to comply with the 
statute.96 
The court of appeals overturned the district court’s decision and held 
that the statute does violate the Commerce Clause because the statute is 
clearly directed at interstate commerce and interstate commerce alone.97 The 
court of appeals applied the two tiered test described in Section III.B of this 
Article, holding the statute per se invalid because it directly regulates 
interstate commerce.98 The statute directly regulates national collegiate 
athletic associations, which are defined as groups operating in forty or more 
states, meaning that the statute only regulates interstate state organizations 
like the NCAA.99 Thus, the court of appeals states, “[t]he Statute regulates 
only interstate organizations which are engaged in interstate commerce, and 
it does so directly.”100 
Forcing the NCAA to comply with the Nevada statute would have a 
negatively profound effect on the way the NCAA enforces its rules and 
regulates the integrity of its product, a result the court says is unacceptable.101 
To comply with the statute, the NCAA would be forced to adopt Nevada’s 
procedural rules for Nevada schools.102 In order to preserve the integrity of 
its own product, the NCAA would be forced to adopt the Nevada procedures 
nationwide, as enforcing a uniform set of procedures amongst its member 
institutions is a key pillar of the NCAA.103 This forced adoption of the 
statute’s procedures runs afoul of the Commerce Clause because “the 
practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries 
of the State,”104 regardless of what the intent of the legislature was.105 It also 
runs afoul of the Commerce Clause because it would conflict with similar 








101 Id. at 638–39. 
102 Id. at 639. 
103 Id. at 638–39. 
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State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)). 
105 Miller, 10 F.3d at 639. 
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statutes in other states.106 “[T]he Commerce Clause protects against 
inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory 
regime into the jurisdiction of another State.”107 If one state requires greater 
procedural guarantees than another, or one requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and another by a preponderance of the evidence, then the 
NCAA’s preservation of a uniform set of procedures would be significantly 
disrupted.108 The inconsistent obligations of the NCAA caused by the 
extraterritorial effects of the statute “demonstrate why it constitutes a per se 
violation of the Commerce Clause.”109 
While the court of appeals reversed the decision on the basis of the 
statute being per se invalid, it noted in a footnote that “[i]f balancing were 
necessary or appropriate, the balance struck by the learned trial judge was 
exactly right.”110 Upon applying the Pike balancing test, the district court in 
Miller found that the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeded the 
local benefits.111 The public interest served by the Nevada statute was to 
afford basic due process safeguards, one that the district court deemed 
legitimate.112 However, the burden on the NCAA clearly exceeded the benefit 
to the local interest.113 The statute substantially restricts the NCAA from 
establishing uniform rules to govern interstate collegiate athletics and 
effectively compels the NCAA to adopt the procedural rules enacted by the 
Nevada statute nationwide.114 For these reasons, the district court decided 
that the harm to the NCAA’s system of internal governance and enforcement 
clearly outweighed any benefits of the additional due process safeguards and 
held the statute invalid.115 
                                                                                                                           
 
106 Id. 
107 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336–37 (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88–89 
(1987)). 
108 Miller, 10 F.3d at 639–40. 
109 Id. at 640. 
110 Miller, 10 F.3d at 640 n.8. 
111 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1483–85 (D. Nev. 1992). 
112 Id. at 1483. 
113 Id. at 1484. 
114 Id. at 1484–85. 
115 Id. at 1485. 
 
2020] CALIFORNIA’S FAIR PAY TO PLAY ACT 89 
 
Vol. 39, No. 1 (2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.205 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
V. APPLYING THE TWO-TIERED TEST TO THE FAIR PAY TO PLAY ACT 
Upon applying the two-tiered test for analyzing state legislation under 
the Commerce Clause, it is clear that the Fair Pay to Play Act must be struck 
down as per se invalid.116 Furthermore, even if the statute is not found to be 
per se invalid under the first tier, the burden on interstate commerce clearly 
exceeds the local benefits and therefore must be held invalid under the second 
tier of the Pike balancing test. 
A. Tier One: The Fair Pay to Play Act is Per Se Invalid 
The Fair Pay to Play Act is per se invalid because it directly regulates 
interstate commerce. The Act provides that, 
An athletic association, conference, or other group or organization with authority 
over intercollegiate athletics, including but not limited to, the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, shall not prevent a student of a postsecondary educational 
institution participating in intercollegiate athletics from earning compensation as 
a result of the use of the student’s name, image, or likeness. (emphasis added).117 
By its terms, the Act directly regulates interstate organizations, explicitly 
listing the NCAA. This is an example of an even more direct regulation of 
interstate commerce than the statute in Miller, which regulated national 
collegiate athletic associations generally (although its effect was to regulate 
the NCAA and no other organization). As previously stated, the NCAA is 
engaged in interstate commerce by way of its interstate marketing, 
coordination of events that require transporting students across state lines, 
and control of national television broadcasting of collegiate athletics.118 
Because the NCAA is engaged in interstate commerce, regulation of the 
NCAA is regulation of interstate commerce. As a result, the Fair Pay to Play 
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Act is a direct regulation of interstate commerce, the kind of regulation that 
is prohibited under the Commerce Clause. 
The Fair Pay to Play Act is also similar to the statute in Miller because 
in order to avoid liability under the Act, the NCAA would be forced to adopt 
the Act’s requirements for California schools. For example, the Fair Pay to 
Play Act prohibits the NCAA from preventing students from participating in 
intercollegiate athletics if the student hires an agent or other professional 
representation.119 NCAA bylaws deem ineligible for participation in 
intercollegiate sports any individual who has ever agreed to be represented 
by or has been represented by an agent.120 In order to comply with the Fair 
Pay to Play Act, the NCAA would be forced to allow individuals attending 
California schools to hire agents. If the NCAA wishes to preserve the uniform 
enforcement of rules and requirements so central to the integrity of its 
product, it would be forced to adopt the Fair Pay to Play Act nationwide. By 
forcing the NCAA into compliance with its terms nationwide, the effect of 
the Fair Pay to Play Act would be to control the regulation of the NCAA’s 
product occurring wholly outside of California. This sort of extraterritorial 
effect of state legislation is exactly the type forbidden by the Commerce 
Clause. 
For the reasons described above, the Fair Pay to Play Act directly 
regulates interstate commerce and is per se invalid because it represents the 
sort of extraterritorial-affecting legislation that the Commerce Clause was 
designed to prohibit. 
B. Tier Two: The Burden on Interstate Commerce Clearly Exceeds the 
Local Benefits 
In the unlikely event that the Fair Pay to Play Act is not held per se 
invalid, it will still be held invalid under the Commerce Clause because the 
burden it creates on interstate commerce clearly exceeds any local benefits. 
The intent of the Fair Pay to Play Act, as described in the Act’s text, is to 
avoid the exploitation of student athletes, colleges, and universities.121 Other 
purposes of the Act articulated by some of its supporters include to “restore 
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to student athletes a right everyone else has: the right to earn money from 
their name, image, and likeness,”122 and addressing civil rights issues of 
equity and fairness resulting from coaches and universities earning millions 
off of the labor of the student athletes.123 Promoting equity, fairness, and the 
preservation of fundamental rights are certainly legitimate state interests. 
However, the burden on interstate commerce exceeds any local benefits 
because of the excessive burden it places on the NCAA. Like compliance 
with the statute in Miller, compliance with the Fair Pay to Play Act would 
require the NCAA to either abandon the set of uniform rules of governance 
it enforces with its member institutions or change its rules nationwide in 
accordance with the Fair Pay to Play Act in order to preserve its set of 
uniform rules. If the NCAA takes the former route, it will be abandoning one 
of its core beliefs—that a system of nationally uniform rules ensures 
competition on an equal basis. If it takes the latter route, then the Fair Pay to 
Play Act will have the effect of regulating the NCAA by forcing it to comply 
with regulations nationwide. In either case, the Fair Pay to Play Act 
significantly burdens the NCAA by invalidating its system of internal 
governance and forcing it to change its rules nationwide. The Commerce 
Clause was created to prevent state legislation from having that exact 
nationwide, extraterritorial effect. 
While the state interests of ensuring equity, fairness, and protection of 
fundamental rights are legitimate, they are hardly more legitimate than 
providing due process safeguards like those in Miller. Both pieces of 
legislation seek to protect a fundamental right among its citizens. Since the 
Miller court found that the state interest was not compelling enough to 
outweigh the harm to the NCAA and interstate commerce, I see no distinction 
in this case to justify a contrary conclusion; the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal 
opinion in Miller is binding precedent. It is therefore clear that the Fair Pay 
to Play Act is invalid under the Pike balancing test because its effect in the 
NCAA and interstate commerce far exceeds the furtherance of the state’s 
legitimate interests. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Fair Pay to Play Act marked a significant step forward for student 
athletes. Unfortunately for supporters of paying student athletes, it does not 
seem like the Act will survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. To date, the Act 
has not faced any formal challenges to its legality, so only time will tell. The 
pressure on the NCAA to develop a regulatory scheme that allows student 
athletes to earn compensation is on the rise as more states propose similar 
legislation.124 Interestingly enough, the NCAA, since 2001, has allowed U.S. 
Olympians to compete in college sports despite receiving thousands of 
dollars from the U.S. Olympic Committee for winning a gold, silver, or 
bronze medal, so it is not completely averse to allowing student athletes to 
earn money for their athletic skills.125 
Since the Fair Pay to Play Act’s passage, the NCAA and its member 
organizations have demonstrated that they are willing to adapt and allow 
student athletes to earn compensation from their name, image, and likeness. 
In October 2019, the NCAA’s Board of Governors voted unanimously to 
permit student athletes the opportunity to benefit from the use of their name, 
image, and likeness.126 The Board’s vote tasked the NCAA’s three major 
divisions with considering updates to bylaws and policies that will modernize 
the NCAA while preserving the association’s core principles and guidelines, 
including prioritizing education and fair and balanced competition.127 
In July 2020, the NCAA’s Power 5 conferences, which include the 
ACC, Big 10, Big 12, Pac 12, and SEC, proposed legislation governing 
name, image, and likeness that they plan to introduce to Congress.128 The 
proposal grants each student athlete the right to license his or her name, 
                                                                                                                           
 
124 Alan Blinder, After California Law, Statehouses Push to Expand Rights of College Athletes, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/sports/ncaa-athletes-pay-california 
.html. 
125 Jon Solomon, The History Behind the Debate Over Paying Student Athletes, THE ASPEN INST. 
(Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behind-debate-paying-ncaa-athletes/. 
126 Stacy Osborn, Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness 
Opportunities, NCAA (Oct. 29, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-
governors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities. 
127 Id. 
128 Ross Dellenger, Proposed NCAA NIL Legislation Is a Restrictive First Step for Student-Athletes, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 17, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/07/17/ncaa-proposed-name-
image-likeness-legislation-student-athletes. 
 
2020] CALIFORNIA’S FAIR PAY TO PLAY ACT 93 
 
Vol. 39, No. 1 (2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.205 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
image, and likeness subject to “narrow safeguards,”129 which permit the 
NCAA to prohibit certain types of payments, like ones meant to induce a 
prospective athlete to attend a particular institution.130 The NCAA presented 
Congress with a version of a proposal for name, image, and likeness 
legislation in July 2020 that one reporter described as “skew[ing] bold.”131 
The NCAA argues that without sufficient safeguards, any name, image, and 
likeness legislation threatens gender equity, creates tax liability for student 
athletes, establishes an employer-employee relationship between schools and 
athletes, and invites corruption into college campuses.132 The NCAA’s 
proposal grants students athletes certain rights to profit from their name, 
image, and likeness, but significantly restricts those rights.133 As described 
by New Jersey Senator Cory Booker in a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing 
on July 22, 2020, “[t]he proposal is so restrictive that it would prevent college 
athletes from receiving any endorsement deals from any organization that 
doesn’t have an existing or prospective contract with their institution or with 
any of their competitors.”134 
The NCAA’s proposal and state legislation like the Fair Pay to Play Act 
represent opposite ends of the spectrum, the former being restrictive of 
student athletes and retaining control for the NCAA, the latter granting 
student athletes virtually uninhibited use of their name, image, and likeness. 
The NCAA vowed to establish new rules and standards that address name, 
image, and likeness use no later than June 30, 2021.135 However, given their 
initial proposal, the two sides do not seem to be close to an acceptable 
scheme. The Fair Pay to Play Act does not take effect until 2023,136 leaving 
ample time for the NCAA to adapt, for the Act to be challenged, or for 
Congress to step in and pass federal legislation on the issue. It seems clear 
that the NCAA is determined to change its rules and regulations to allow 
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student athletes to profit from their name, image, and likeness. How exactly 
those rules and regulations will change is a mystery. 
